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Executive Summary 
“We must enhance the knowledge of the monks and nuns about patriotism and law. Tibetan Buddhism must se lf-
reform ... they must adapt themselves to suit the development and stabilisation of Tibet ... Religious tenets and 
practices which do not comply with a socialist society should be changed.” 
(A Golden Bridge Leading to a New Era, TAR Party document, 1996, p. 39) 
Since 1950, the government of the Peoples‟ Republic of China has sought to control the dominant Buddhist religion and its 
leadership in Tibet as a means to ensure the integration and security of Tibetan regions within China. The age of the present Dalai 
Lama and the question of a possible future re-incarnation brings these issues to the fore. It is likely that the Chinese government 
and Tibetan government-in-exile will declare separate candidates for the Dalai Lama's re-incarnation. Such a dispute may 
precipitate large-scale violent unrest across the Tibetan cultural area with potentially grave human rights implications for those 
involved. 
Tibetan Buddhism not only asserts the doctrine of re-incarnation, but recognises a central place for „incarnate lamas‟ – Buddhist 
teachers who inherit property and status from one re-incarnation to the next - both in its religious leadership and in its traditional 
systems of state government. The most important of these have traditionally been the Dalai, Panchen and Karmapa Lamas, 
although there still exist hundreds of such „lineages‟ of recognised reincarnations.  
While PRC policy regarding Tibetan religious leadership followed communist atheist doctrine during the Cultural Revolution period, 
modern policies have revived the imperial precedent of using the institution of incarnate lamas as a means for pragmatic political 
control in Tibet and Mongolia. This control is manifest through post-1990 Patriotic Education campaigns in Tibetan areas and, more 
recently, the 2007 'Management Measures for the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism', which state that all 
incarnates must be recognised by the Chinese Communist Party‟s state apparatus.  
Chinese state control of religious leadership was demonstrated in 1995 following the Fourteenth Dalai Lama‟s recognition of the 
young Tibetan boy Gendun Choekyi Nyima as the reincarnation of the recently deceased Panchen Lama.  PRC authorities placed 
the boy, his family and many of those involved in detention and announced their own candidate, Gyalcen Norbu. Neither Gendun 
Choekyi Nyima nor his family have been seen since. 
Today, the primary importance of these issues lies in the age of the present Dalai Lama, and the recognition of a future re-
incarnation. While the present Dalai Lama has said that he will not be reborn in an “Tibet under Chinese control”
i
, contestation 
between Beijing and Dharamsala over a future re-incarnation is highly likely. Such a dispute could have repercussions far beyond 
the religious sphere, sparking large-scale violent unrest across the Tibetan cultural area. Under such a situation, unrest would most 
likely dissolve into several different factions, and chronic low-level insurgency in Tibet. This problem is exacerbated by a 
traditionalist focus on the Dalai Lama by the PRC, the international community and Tibetans themselves, to the effective exclusion 
of other Tibetan political figures, whether religiously or democratically chosen.   
Historical Background 
Incarnate Lamas in Tibetan History 
The institution of the incarnate lama – or tülku – is a Buddhist tradition unique to Tibet. Regarded as the reincarnation 
of previous religious leaders and sometimes the earthly emanation of Buddhist deities
ii
, incarnate lamas are religious 
teachers who inherit the landed property and religious authority of their previous incarnations. The first known 
example of this institution was in the twelfth century, when the reincarnation of Buddhist teacher Düsum Khyenpa 
(1110-1193) was recognised as the „Second‟ Karmapa Lama of the influential Kagyü school of Tibetan Buddhism. The 
idea of „incarnate lamas‟ actually took several hundred years to gain wide acceptance in Tibetan religious culture, 
developing complex doctrines as well as elaborate tests to identify „true‟ reincarnations
iii
. While the precise identity of 
incarnates was a religious matter, the ownership of the land and titles associated with such lineages often came under 
the control of Tibetan ruling families. 
In 1511, the young monk Gendun Gyatso was recognised as the reincarnation of Gendundrup, one of the disciples of 
Tsongkapa, the founder of the rising Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism. When this monk‟s own reincarnation made an 
alliance with Altan Khan, leader of the Mongolian tribes to the north-east of Tibet, he was given the title of Talai (or 
Dalai – „great ocean‟) Lama, and his predecessors became retrospectively known as the First and Second Dalai 
Lamas. The alliance between the Dalai Lamas and the Mongols allowed the Geluk School to rise to prominence 
amidst Tibet‟s turbulent political landscape. War with the neighbouring Tibetan kingdoms of Tsang and Beri eventually 
brought the Fifth Dalai Lama to the throne in 1642, and his personal religious estate, the Ganden Podrang, became 
the basis of the new government at Lhasa. The rise of the „Great Fifth‟ to rulership over Tibet had in no small part 
been due to the authority and peacemaking powers of his ageing Buddhist tutor, Lobsang Chökyi Gyaltsen (1567-
1662), owner of the influential Tashilhunpo monastery in Xigatse, whom the new Tibetan Government recognised as 
the First Panchen (or Pandita Chenmo – „great scholar‟) Lama. While there have often been tensions between these 
two powerful religious estates, the role of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas in recognising one another‟s re-incarnations 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries led to them being regarded as „father and son‟, their roles intimately 
linked even in Tibetan Buddhist cosmology. By the seventeenth century, identification of the Dalai Lama and other 
high incarnates involved consultation of state oracles, the visions and dreams of their disciples and regents, the 
interpretation of omens and lotteries and tests regarding candidates‟ memories of their previous lives. 
The Dalai, Panchen and Karmapa Lamas are certainly the best known incarnate lamas in Tibet, but they are by no 
means alone. By the start of the twentieth century, there were over two thousand tülku lineages in Tibetan Buddhism: 
their religious authority dominated the religious imagination of Tibetan (and, in large part, Mongolian and Western 
Chinese) life, just as their combined religious and agricultural estates dominated the landscape of Tibet itself.  
Imperial Control from Beijing 
The importance of the institution of the incarnate lama – and particularly incarnates such as the Dalai and Panchen 
Lamas – was not lost on the courts of imperial China. While Tibet itself was only of marginal interest, the Third Dalai 
Lama‟s „second conversion‟ to Buddhism of the fractious Mongol factions to China‟s north meant that the religious 
influence of Tibetan incarnates became a crucial factor in the overall security of Beijing‟s imperial possessions. 
Successive Chinese emperors presented themselves as powerful patrons and protectors of the Geluk school of 
Tibetan Buddhism, a diplomatic relationship understood by the Tibetan government in terms of the long-standing 
chöyon (patron-priest) relationship
iv
. In this capacity, imperial forces intervened several times in Tibet to maintain 
politically favourable conditions there: in 1717, following the ransacking of Lhasa by the Dzungar Mongols the Kanxi 
emperor placed the Seventh Dalai Lama on the throne, instigating Tibet‟s two centuries as an imperial protectorate. In 
1792, amidst Tibet‟s trade war with Nepal, the Qianlong emperor sent new „regulations‟ for the recognition of all senior 
incarnate lamas, including the use of the infamous „golden urn‟ ceremony. The 29-point regulations stated: 
“Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama are the heads of the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. Traditionally their 
reincarnations are decided by divination in front of the Four Protectors, and that has found to be inaccurate due to 
human errors. To promote Gelugpa Buddhism, the Emperor grants the Golden Urn to Tibet. Since the Dalai Lama is 
the mentor for the Panchen Lama, and vice versa, therefore each side should find the reincarnation of the other party 
by divination with the Golden Urn”. (乾隆《钦定藏内善后章程二十九条》, 1792). 
The urns were used as a system of lottery to be carried out before a shrine to the Buddha, following offerings and 
prayers. The name-stick that jumped out following the shaking of the urn would contain the name of the divinely 
chosen candidate. 
Two golden urns were issued: one enshrined in Jokhang Temple in Lhasa for choosing Dalai and Panchen Lama 
reincarnations; the other is in Yonghe Palace in Beijing for choosing senior Mongolian reincarnations. These new 
regulations were to be overseen by the imperial ambans (representatives) stationed in Lhasa. The historical evidence 
suggests that such regulations were deployed on an episodic basis, and accepted by the Tibetan government at 
Lhasa within the context of three conditions: firstly, that the Chinese Emperor was acting as a Buddhist with strong 
Geluk affiliations; secondly, that he was acting as the religious and military protector of Tibet, following the ransacking 
of Lhasa by invading Mongols in 1717; and finally, that imperial involvement via the ambans was primarily passive in 
nature – that Tibetans themselves got to choose the candidate or candidates, which were 
ratified (often years later) by the imperial authorities in China. Moreover, these urns were 
regarded as just one of a number of possible divinatory methods for establishing 
succession along with oracular declaration, astrology and dreams. 
The current Dalai Lama was enthroned in the Potala Palace on February 22, 1940, during a 
ceremony attended by Wu Zhongxin, minister of the Commission for Mongolian and 
Tibetan Affairs of the nationalist government of the Republic of China (1911-49). The 
nationalist government accepted that he be confirmed as the reincarnation of the 13th Dalai 
Lama without the occasional practice of drawing lot from the golden urn and that he instead 
directly succeeds as the 14
th
 Dalai Lama. This well documented search for the current Dalai 
Lama clearly shows that many and varied methods used to confirm the reincarnation of the 
Tibetan ruler. 
The Modern Era 
The collapse of Chinese imperial rule in 1912 instigated a period of political independence 
for Tibet, and civil war for the China. When Chairman Mao‟s communist forces finally 
prevailed in 1947, the incorporation of Tibet into the newly formed Peoples‟ Republic of 
China was one of its first stated goals as a government. Like their imperial predecessors, 
Mao‟s newly formed government were fully aware of the political standing of incarnate 
lamas in the question of ruling Tibetan populations. Following the invasion of Tibet in 
1949-50, the Seventeen Point Agreement negotiated between Beijing and the Lhasa 
peace delegation guaranteed the “established status, functions and powers” of the Dalai 
and Panchen Lamas
v
. In the years immediately following the invasion, the Dalai and 
Panchen Lamas were made members of the Standing Committee of the PRC‟s National 
People's Congress and respectively Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory 
Committee of the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART), charged with overseeing Tibet‟s 
constitutional incorporation into the People‟s Republic of China. While these roles were in 
large part sinecures, and the PCART wholly secondary to the might of the PLA‟s military 
jurisdiction in Tibet, it spoke to the understanding that the early communists had of 
Buddhism‟s constitutional and popular importance in ruling Tibet. 
Much of this situation changed with the Tibetan Uprising of 1956-9, and the flight of the Dalai Lama and much of his 
remaining government into exile in March 1959. The military suppression of the Uprising was followed by a vilification 
of the Dalai Lama, and Beijing sought to bring forward the initially more politically-compliant Panchen Lama as a 
replacement
vi
. However, when the young Panchen Lama wrote a 70,000 character petition criticising Chinese policies 
in Tibet in 1962, he too was vilified through extensive revolutionary „struggle sessions‟, imprisoned until 1977, and did 
not re-appear in public life until 1982. The early 1980s constituted limited re-birth of Tibetan religious culture after the 
depredations of the Cultural Revolution years, and the politically-adept Panchen Lama was a critical figure in this 
renaissance; his premature and unexpected death in 1989 has been the object of considerable speculation, 
conjectures which have however been overshadowed by the politically disastrous events surrounding the recognition 
of his re-incarnation (see Focus, below). 
1: The Qianlong Emperor, 
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Excerpt: Patriotic Education Book I 
The following is a translated exerpt of A Brief 
Summary Explanation of the Announcement 
on the History of Tibet, the first of four books 
issued to monks, nuns and religious officials 
in Tibet by the work teams of the Patriotic 
Education Campaign, June 1996: 
Contents 
1. Tibet and China co-existed in friendship from 
ancient times. 
2. How Tibet became part of China. 
3. How the central government of China during the 
Yuan period took care of Tibet. 
4. The central government of China under the Yuan 
period not only had the power of appointment and 
dismissal, rewards and punishment with respect to 
the leaders of the at various levels in the local 
government of Tibet, but also exercised the 
authority to conduct census and instituting “aja’ 
mo” (tax on post runners carrying government 
messages). 
5. How the Ming Dynasty exercised effective 
control of the Tibetan areas. 
6. How the Ming Dynasty gave edicts to the big 
lamas of the various sects of Tibet. 
7. The relationship between the Qing Emperor and 
the Dalai Lama is like a master and his servant. 
... 
10. Proclaiming the 29-point ordinance to 
establish new Tibetan customs and introducing the 
new custom of “shaking the Golden Urn”. 
11. The central government of the Qing Dynasty 
held the authority to grant recognition to the 
successive reincarnations of the Dalai Lama ad the 
prerogative to preside over the enthronement 
ceremonies.” 
 (Source: Political Campaigns: Documents and 
Statements from Tibet, 1996-7. London: Tibet 
Information Network, 1998, p. 7-8.. 
 
PRC Religious Policy in Tibet Today 
The important but intractable position that incarnate lamas hold in the Beijing‟s relationship with Tibetan populations 
has caused the Chinese Communist Party to direct considerable constitutional and political will to the problem. This is 
in three regards: extensive deliberations on, and redefinitions of, the meaning of religion within the Chinese 
Constitution; tightening of political control and police regulations pertaining to both religion as a whole, and the 
treatment, designation and activities of incarnate lamas in particular; and extensive campaigns associated with the 
control of public loyalty to incarnate lamas. 
The role of the Dalai Lama as the principal focus of loyalty amongst Tibetan protesters in the large-scale protests of 
the late 1980s (and more recently in 2008) has proven problematic in terms of the PRC‟s explicit constitutional 
guarantees of religious freedom for its citizens, enshrined in Article 36 of 
the 1982 Constitution. Responding to this, the PRC‟s Third Forum for 
Work on Tibet argued that the essence of religion was patriotism, and 
therefore that, because of their „splittist activities‟, figures such as the 
Dalai Lama could not be counted as genuinely religious, and therefore 
that demonstrations of loyalty to them could not be protected under the 
banner of religious freedom. Thus, on the 10 March 1995, the Chinese 
language version of Tibet Daily argued: 
“The purpose of Buddhism is to deliver all living beings in a peaceful 
manner. Now that Dalai and his clique have violated the religious doctrine 
and have even spread rumours to fool and incite people against the other, 
in what way can he be regarded as a spiritual leader? ... As for the Dalai, 
he has always incorporated „Tibetan independence‟ into the doctrines 
which he preaches in his sermons, ... wildly using godly strength to poison 
and bewitch the masses ... such flagrant deceptiveness and demagoguery 
constitute a blasphemy to Buddhism”
vii
   
It is within the context of this constitutional logic that, for example, 
ownership of or showing photographs of the Dalai Lama has been banned 
within the PRC since 1993. This position dramatically intensified with the 
1995 controversy over the recognition of the new Panchen Lama (see 
below). 
As part of this wider constitutional logic, new regulations have been 
introduced in Tibet for the regulation of the recognition and activities of 
incarnate lamas. Often called the MMR ('Management Measures for the 
Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism' - Chin: Zangchuan 
fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa), these were approved by the PRC‟s 
State Administration of Religious Affairs on 13 July 2007. This fourteen 
point document asserted state control over searches, testing, recognition, 
enthronement, education and religious training of any incarnate lama 
(Chin. huofo - literally "living Buddha"). The Central Tibetan Administration 
(CTA) in Dharamsala, seat of the exiled Dalai Lama, has described the 
new document as "ludicrous and unwarranted" and "an attempt to further 
repress and undermine the religious culture of Tibet", arguing that placing 
authority over the recognition of re-incarnation under that of an atheist 
government is a contradiction in terms. 
Tibetan attitudes regarding the Dalai Lama and the general religious 
importance of incarnates remain strong amongst the public, particularly 
within the Buddhist monasteries, and state authorities have engaged in a number of high profile campaigns to bring 
such sentiments under government control. The most marked of these have been the „Patriotic Education‟ campaigns 
of the 1990s, in which work teams visited monasteries and temples across Tibet to enforce education on the Beijing 
government‟s view on Tibetan history, the institutions of Tibetan Buddhism and, not least, the standing and role of the 
present and previous Dalai Lamas. 
Focus: the Panchen Lama Dispute 
The death of the Tenth Panchen Lama in 1989 was both unexpected and, ultimately, profoundly 
compromised the fledgling rapprochement between Beijing and the Central Tibetan 
Administration of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama in Dharamsala that had emerged in the early 
1990s. While some degree of agreement had occurred between the two administrations over the 
choice of the Karmapa Lama in 1992, disagreements over the choice and timing of the 
recognition of the Eleventh Panchen Lama caused a catastrophic rift that remains to this day, 
primarily because of the impact of these decisions on the question of any future re-incarnation of 
the present Dalai Lama (see below). 
While there are some suggestions that authorities in Tibet and Dharamsala engaged in both 
overt and clandestine co-operation over the initial stages of the search for a reincarnation
viii
, this 
evaporated in May 1995 when the Dalai Lama named Gedhun Choeki Nyima as the rightful 
reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama. Often referred to as the „youngest political prisoner in 
the world‟, Gedhun Choeki Nyima and his family were taken into „protective custody‟ by PRC 
officials three days after the Dalai Lama‟s announcement, and has not been seen by 
independent observers since
ix
. 
On 29 November 1995, TAR authorities held a secret divination ceremony using the Golden 
Urn, to decide upon its own candidate for the Panchen Lama. Bomi Rinpoche, an incarnate 
who had the previous day been made Acting Throne Holder of Ganden Monastery, was chosen 
to carry out the ceremony
x
, attended by state officials and the abbots of prominent Gelukpa 
monasteries. The ceremony, in which sticks carrying the names of candidates were drawn from 
the Golden Urn, was carried out in Lhasa‟s main Jokhang Temple in secret before dawn. The 
Golden Urn lottery named Gyancen Norbu (Qoigyijabu) as the 11th Panchen Lama. 
Arjia Rinpoche, previous Abbot of Kumbum monastery and Deputy Chairman of the Chinese 
Buddhist Association, has described in his autobiography the atmosphere of coercion and 
threat surrounding these events, and the relatively overt „fixing‟ of the Golden Urn divination
xi
. 
Chosen as future tutor to the young Gyalcen Norbu, Arjia Rinpoche fled into exile in 2000.  At a 
subsequent commission on religious freedom in China, he stated:  
“Had I remained in Tibet I would have been forced to denounce the Dalai Lama and my religion 
and to serve the Chinese Government. This meant also participating in government practices 
that went against my religion and personal beliefs. As Abbot of the Kumbum Monastery, I would 
have been forced to help the government have its choice of the Panchen Lama accepted by the 
Tibetan people. This would violate my deepest beliefs. It was at this point that I knew I had to 
leave my country.”
xii
 
Focus: The Succession of the Dalai Lama 
Alongside the history of the Panchen Lama dispute, the imposition of the MMR regulations 
raises obvious questions regarding the succession of the present Fourteenth Dalai Lama. While 
the present Dalai Lama is overtly in good health, questions of his age and that of the future 
leadership of the Tibetan exiled movement are now raised on a regular basis. His Holiness has 
unequivocally stated on several occasions that he would not choose to be reborn within an 
„unfree Tibet‟, but rather in exile
xiii
. The present Dalai Lama denies the Chinese Communist 
Party‟s right to choose or recognise his successor, primarily because of the CCP‟s status as an 
atheist state. Nonetheless, given the investment that the Beijing government have placed in the 
issue over the last few decades, it is almost inconceivable that they will not wish to instal a 
Fifteenth Dalai Lama of their own upon the death of the Fourteenth.  
The consequences of such an action could be both grave and enduring – both for the exiled Tibetan movement and 
for internal security within the PRC. Regardless of claims by the PRC, there is no evidence that the Dalai Lama either 
instigates or co-ordinates „splittist‟ or violent activities within Tibet such as the protests of 2008; indeed, the Dalai 
Lama‟s public advocacy of non-violence has clearly restrained the development of violent Tibetan nationalism both 
5: Gyalcen Norbu, 
the ‘Chinese choice’, 
at his enthronement 
ceremony. 
3: Gedhun Choekyi 
Nyima, the Dalai 
Lama’s choice 
4: Bomi Rinpoche 
and the Golden Urn 
ceremony, Lhasa 
1995 
within Tibet and exile. Nevertheless, he is clearly both a symbol of unification for Tibetans and for the persistent and 
growing discontent that is widely felt towards PRC government policies in the region. In the almost inevitable case of a 
contestation over the succession, widespread violence may well break out amongst Tibetans protesting the installation 
of a Party-backed candidate. Given the depth of religious sentiment and loyalty that surrounds the present Dalai Lama, 
such protests may well include all regions and classes of the Tibetan population, as was indicated by the 2008 
protests. While it is doubtful that such protests could seriously challenge Beijing‟s sovereignty in Tibet, they may well 
involve a large number of casualties, and certainly a larger number of arrests and detentions. The human rights 
implications of such events are grave. 
In the absence of a sitting Dalai Lama, it is unlikely that any religious leaders of the existing ranks (either within Tibet 
or in exile) that could contain or give form to popular Tibetan sentiment on the matter. The present Dalai Lama‟s 
religious and political influence – which extends far beyond the confines of the Geluk School of Tibetan Buddhism, 
and beyond the confines of his pre-1950 status of head of the Tibetan government – is very much a function of his 
personal authority, and has expanded considerably during his time in exile. In this sense, just as there would be no 
clear leadership to anti-Chinese protest, there would equally be no obvious means of controlling it or predicting its 
course. International focus on the Dalai Lama at the expense of other Tibetan leaders both inside and outside Tibet, 
only exacerbates this problem.  
At the same time, the progressive incorporation of the ranks of senior tulku as representatives of Beijing Party 
interests may be less effective in the long run than the CCP anticipates. There is no guarantee that the present 
importance of incarnates such as the Dalai and Panchen Lamas will continue on into the future. The rise of popular lay 
leaders may be equally important, as it has been at key moments in Tibet‟s past. Similarly, evidence already suggests 
that alternative and charismatic forms of religious authority are emerging within the TAR and its surrounding Tibetan 
areas. These are increasingly circumventing state control, providing an alternative focus for religious and political 
affiliation.  
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